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Book Review
THE PSYCHOLOGY

OF THE CRIMINAL ACT AND PUNISHMENT.

By Gregory Zilboorg. New York. Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
1954. Pp. xi, 141. $3.50.
In 1953, Dr. Gregory Zilboorg' was chosen as the second
recipient of the Isaac Ray Award and was asked therefore
to deliver a series of lectures at Yale University under the
joint auspices of the Schools of Medicine and Law. The
award is annually conferred upon one who, in the judgment
of a committee of the American Psychiatric Association, is
most worthy by reason of his contribution toward improved
relations between Law and Psychiatry. It is interesting to
note that it was the author, himself, who was chiefly instrumental in causing the Association to establish the award
a year earlier. Its first recipient, Dr. Winfred Overholser,
was author of The Psychiatristand the Law,2 a small book
based upon lectures delivered at Harvard University in
1952.
The Psychology of the CriminalAct and Punishment is
an amplification of Dr. Zilboorg's Yale presentation, the
lectures serving as an outline for the book. The author
begins with a chapter, titled The Nature and the Quality of
the Act, in which he describes what he terms "the eternal
struggle between the striving to punish and the yearning
to understand and forgive".' Though he ascribes this ambivalent urge to mankind as a whole and to each member
thereof, he indicates, that, as a group, the legal profession
primarily seeks to punish, while the medical profession,
particularly the psychiatric segment, seeks to understand.
The emphasis of the law is upon the act, the accent of
medicine is upon the individual actor. Zilboorg shows how
the psychological phenomenon of identification 4 plays a
part in the divergency of legal and medical attitudes. Training, experience, and goal, he feels, tend to cause the doctor
to identify himself with the patient. Those same elements,

IAuthor of: HISTORY OF MEDICAL PSYCHOLOGY

(1941) ; THE MEDICAL MAN
(1943) ; SIGMUND FREUD,

AND THE WITCH (1935) ; MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN
HIS EXPLORATION OF THE MIND OF MAN (1951).
2 Reviewed 14 Md. L. Rev. 390 (1954).
8 ZILBOORG, 4.

'An unconscious process by which an Individual Incorporates within himself a mental picture of an object and thinks, feels and acts as he conceives
the object to think, feel and act. HINSIE AND SHATZKY, PSYCHIATRIC DiCTIONARY (Part II, Supplement 1953).
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however, cause the lawyer to shun any semblance of identification with the criminal and, indeed, to "establish the
greatest possible psychological distance between himself
and the criminal".5 This, the author claims, is a very important source of the evident lack of understanding between law and psychiatry.
Dr. Zilboorg pleads for the introduction of more science,
particularly medical science, into the courtroom, confident
that "emotional decisions which so often appear disguised
as judicious decisions" will thus be avoided.' He passionately condemns the McNaghten Rule 7 as "the monster of
the earnest psychiatrist which prevents him from introducing into the courtroom true understanding of human
psychology and of the psychology of the criminal act".' No
formalistic exclusion rules should bar introduction of any
detail or aspect which would aid in the psychological understanding of a criminal act. To support his almost phobic
abhorrence of the McNaghten Rule, Zilboorg quotes Sir
James Stephen; 9 however, in so doing, he handily lifts pertinent phrases out of context. ° When inquiring into the
meaning of the McNaghten phrase "nature and quality of
the act" Zilboorg assigns to it a moral rather than a cognitive connotation. "Nature" and "quality" as well as knowledge "that he was doing what was wrong" are collectively
treated in terms of the immorality of the act." The author
apparently does not consider the actor's perception of the
physical steps he takes nor his awareness of the harmful
physical consequences of those steps to be anything more
than an enlargement of the concept of morality explicit in
5ZILBOORG,

14.

6Ibid, 7.

"... to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly

proved that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind,
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if
he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong."
McNaghten's Case, 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
The author is by no means alone in his condemnation of the McNaghten
formula. See WmiHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE (1954),
63 et 8eq.; GUTTMACHER and WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW (1952),
407-408; STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883), 154,
159; 'GROUPFOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
AND PSYCHIATRIC EXPERT TESTIMONY, REPORT No. 26 (1954), pp. 2-5. See

also Durham v. U. S., 214 Fed. 2d 862 (1954), noted 15 Md. L. Rev. 44
(1955). Cf. Davidson, The Psychiatrists Role in the Administration of
Criminal Law, 4 Rutgers L. Rev. 578, 587 (1950), in which it is stated:
"... one stark fact remains. Unless a man is held answerable for what
he knows he should not do, there will be no enforceable sanction against
criminal behavior."
9 STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND (1883).
"0Compare ZILBOORG, p. 1 with STEPHEN, Op. cit., ibid, Vol. II, p. 154.
U ZILBOORG, 16, 17.
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the last phrase of the Rule. 12 Such a unitary concept is in
accord with a modern fundamental theory of psychiatry,
namely, that a mental disorder which manifests itself
primarily in one sphere of mental activity indicates disorder of the total mind and not merely of a segment of the
psychological apparatus as a whole. The "'nature and the
quality of the act' has no meaning whatsoever unless we
bring it into harmony with the total personality of the
criminal. ...
.13
In his second chapter, Zilboorg attacks the commonly
held belief that punishment has a deterrent effect upon
criminal activity. He presents statistics to the reader which
tend to show that there exists little, if any, correlation
between severity of punishment and incidence of crime.
Jurisdictions where capital punishment has been abolished
are shown to have a lower homicide rate than those in
which execution is practiced.' It would seem that factors
other than the nature of punishment might well influence
such statistical findings. These Zilboorg acknowledges but
treats as trivial.
The author attempts to substantiate his claim that
punishment is worthless as a deterrent by the use of cases
that unfortunately are not particularly in point. Bonnie
Brown Heady, the co-conspirator in the Greenlease case,
who calmly reads a comic book after confessing to her crime
is cited as one who is not deterred by the thought of imminent execution." It would seem that Heady's conduct
might be classified simply as bravado at a time when no
amount of reflection on her crime could act as a deterrent.
He quotes from Maudsley's description of the trial of Burton to show the ineffectiveness of the deterrence principle.
However, it should be noted that Burton was suffering from
a curious, though psychologically recognized, desire to be
punished. 6 To state that the execution of Burton would not
deter others who are possessed of a like compulsion does
nothing to support the author's theses. However, in pointing out man's progression towards more humane punishment Zilboorg presents a compelling argument that society
does not truly subscribe to the deterrent theory.
1Note
the interpretation of these terms and their application to Hadfield's Case, 27 How. St. Tr. 1282, 1321 (1800), as described in STEPiEN,
op. cit., supra, n. 9, vol. II, 159. See also DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY
(1952), 4, 5.
'a ZILBOORG, 26; GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1925),
226-227; Durham v. United States, supra, n. 8.

ZILBOORG, 28.

Ibid, 30.
Ibid, 26;

MENNINGER, MAN AGAINST HIMSELF

(1938).
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Nevertheless, Zilboorg believes that the criminal must
be isolated from the rest of us. "He has a moral responsibility to meet, a sin to expiate .. ,"' a duty to disclose
his psychological secret. Since an electrocuted, hanged or
gassed corpse has no psychology, Zilboorg wants the living
criminal to be preserved and set aside as the subject of a
psychological inquiry into the workings of the criminal
mind. 8 At this point it is difficult for the reader to escape
a fleeting thought of Buchenwald.
In the chapter, Some Differences In Professional Psychology, Zilboorg points out the chasm between the divergent attitudes and goals of the legal and medical professions. Apprehension and punishment on the one hand or
restoration, correction and cure on the other? Herein lies
a fundamental difference in legal and medical viewpoint
and aim. There is no easy remedy" but stimulation of the
curiosity of both professions in the understanding of the
criminal is prescribed. Through this he hopes that extensive reforms in our systems of punishment and rehabilitation may be brought about.
Zilboorg complains that the law in hesitating to accept
psychological explanations of human conduct justifies its
reluctance on the ground that the jury should be confronted
only with information it can understand. That a jury has
no knowledge of the techniques of identifying blood or
determining the presence of poison in a given organ, is
manifest, yet the jury is permitted to take the results of
such techniques on faith, so to speak. The author doubts
that between this sort of evidence and a psychological
opinion an honest distinction can be drawn.
The antagonism between law and psychiatry, the hostility between members of the two professions, is described
as "but a reflection of the universal antagonism with which
humanity is burdened".2" However, the generalized hostility which man possesses may be differently channeled or
directed depending upon training and environment. The
lawyer is born and lives, Zilboorg believes, in the midst of
established rules and principles to which he is bound to
pay homage under the doctrine of stare decisis, which is,
itself, one of these principles. On the other hand, the doctor's training and experience is with, of and for the in- Ibid, 32.

8Ibid, 33.
"Ibid, 33-35.
Ibid, 38.
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dividual patient. Of necessity the physician identifies himself with his patient for he is brought to realize that he
himself is subject to the same ills.
The conflict is essentially this -

"the lawyer . . . is

taught emotionally, sociologically, and professionally to be
estranged from the people who will become his major concern . . .the physician is taught to become emotionally,

sociologically, and professionally one with the people and
medical conditions
which are to become his chief profes21
sional concern".

In Zilboorg's psychological terminology, the "aggressive
capacity" of the doctor is directed against the affliction, that
of the lawyer - against the violator as well as the violation
of the law.
The author believes that mutual medico-legal hostility
may be dissipated and perhaps ultimately disappear only
if the two professions recognize and agree that the personality is an indivisable totality in which both conscious
and unconscious aggressive tendencies exist.22 Without
joint acceptance of this concept neither psychological cure,
just punishment nor effective rehabilitation of the criminal
is believed possible.
In his fourth chapter, Aggression and Transgression,Dr.
Zilboorg describes and develops his psychological theory
concerning the relationship of unconscious hostility to
crime. His explanation is something like this: Aggression
is universal. It is a special instinctual drive which is omnipresent in all of us. The criminal's acts are motivated by "a
desire to do injury, or enhance his own sense of power ......
They are expressions of aggression. In psychological terms,
he is "acting out" his hostility. From birth onward the individual protests. He learns that his expressions of hostility
are not always welcome and he proceeds with the difficult
task of "handling (his) aggression",
of checking overt and
23
unacceptable aggressive responses.

According to the modern theory of dynamic psychology,
inhibition of an aggressive drive only represses it. It does
not disappear except from the consciousness of the individual. It "gets free sway in the unconscious . . ." and
"causes considerable anxiety and a sense of guilt ....
-24 If

the aggression is turned inward, suicide may result, if
turned outward, murder. It is the neurotic or criminal who
- Ibid, 41.

" Ibid, 44.
-Ibid, 49.
-Ibid, 50.
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gives in to the pressure of his hidden and unconscious
drives and "acts out" his repressed aggression.
Zilboorg's observation that the incidence of suicides
varies inversely as the number of homicides and that the
suicide rate decreases during time of war seems to bear
out his psychological analysis. The reader, however, may
wish for a more authoritative source of such generalized
statistics.
When the law demands a full yet simple explanation
of the reason why a particular individual has submitted to
these pressures and has acted out his hostility, the psychiatrist has difficulty. That which he attempts to describe2
does not lend itself to exact measurement or definition.
The author likens the material with which the psychiatrist
works to pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. A single piece has no
real meaning save as part of the complete picture. It is
only through a jigsaw method of reconstruction that an
individual's "psychological totality" can be synthesized and
perceived. In order to comprehend the enigma of the criminal, knowledge of his developmental history is therefore
essential; however, unfortunately, the executioner frequently cheats psychiatric research of this opportunity. We
are told that often the true motive behind the execution or
punishment in general is nothing more than counter-aggression of the executioners themselves and that ". . . criminal
and pathological forces cannot be stamped out with counter-aggression".2 6
In his chapter, Some Sources of the Drive to Punish, the
belief is advanced that the problem of convicting or not
convicting the criminal involves in essence a psychological
struggle between jurist and doctor. Zilboorg dogmatically
states, "The court, the prosecutor, the jury, insofar as they
are punitive agents, are all motivated by their aggressive
reactions toward the criminal."28 He categorizes these judicial agencies as "agencies of counter aggression" who direct
their hostility toward the criminal aggressor. They are
animated by the self-same drives as those which impel the
prisoner in the dock.
The author supports this rather uncomfortable characterization with the observation that since under our system
punishment follows after the anti-social act and does not
precede it in an attempt at prevention, and since it is at
- Ibid, 53.
Ibid, 66.
- Ibid, 69.
- Ibid, 75.
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most an ineffective deterrent - a thesis he expounded
earlier - the criminal law represents hostility against the
criminal rather than concern about the safety of the
public.2 9 Our quick justice allows us to get rid of the evildoer and forget the offense.' 0
the average man is the
Zilboorg maintains that "...
carrier of the very impulses which are called criminal when
they are acted out"." In the non-criminal these impulses
are repressed and result in anxiety unless they are dissipated in an acceptable way. In relation to the criminal we
may make one of two opposing choices; deny similarity
with the culprit and wreak our hostility upon him, or admit
our affinity and assume a more tolerant, charitable attitude
to the actor even though we condemn the act.
We are told that those who have a part in the condemnation of a transgressor are themselves burdened thereby.
It is brought to our attention that the average prosecutor
or jurist rarely witnesses the execution he was instrumental in achieving. This, Zilboorg explains, is because he
who metes out punishment does so in an unconscious spirit
of revenge which in turn creates a feeling of guilt.
His assumption that punishment causes guilt is a clear
indication to the author that it can never be completely
satisfactory to the human conscience nor can it attain its
declared object, viz., the prevention of crime through deterrence, penitence and rehabilitation.2
Zilboorg, however, does not advocate liberation for the
transgressor. He disclaims the notion, which society seems
to have, that the psychiatrist fancies to free the criminal
and let him loose to prey upon the luckless citizen. The
author's alternative to punishment is not entirely clear to
the reviewer unless perhaps it be confinement for the purpose of psychological experimentation.
In the concluding chapter, Some Suggestions About Psychiatry and Psychiatrists,Zilboorg notes the distrust with
which the doctor and particularly the psychiatrist is perceived by the public. When he extends his interests into
neighboring fields and beyond mere body temperature,
pulse rate and clinical diagnosis, he is viewed with suspicion. Hostility is particularly evident in the courtroom.
Here the psychiatrist is suspect on various grounds; that
he advocates liberation of the criminal, that he is impetuous
-

Ibid!, 77.
Ibid, 87.
Ibid, 79.
Ibid, 94.
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and rashly desires change in penal law and that he often
disagrees with his fellows, - the latter, a rather incongruous reason to be advanced by a lawyer, Zilboorg suggests. The author admits no validity to any of these arguments. He paints a picture of lawyer versus lawyer hostility with the innocent psychiatrist in between, saying that
there is no "clash of opinion but a clash of
lawyers, with
33
psychiatrists in the role of baseball bats".
Zilboorg protests that the usual questions put to the
psychiatrist in a criminal case are moral or legal but in no
sense psychiatric questions. He argues that clinical psychiatry does not know of a condition called legal insanity.
It "never saw it, and after almost two hundred years of
clinical investigations seriously doubts its existence".34
He charges that our legal system has become formalized and the technicalities of legal procedure have been
given more importance than they deserve. The reader will
perhaps agree that the law is at times over-zealous in preserving form and technical procedure. However, one must
be aware that the formalities were early developed as a
guard against arbitrary findings and today are still effective
protective devices.
According to the author, psychiatry unlike the law, cannot be formalized, but must adapt itself to the unique individual toward which it is presently directed. He complains that under our system of criminal procedure no
opportunity is provided for a proper presentation of the
psychiatric point of view. 5 The common procedural principal permitting an "expert for each side is a corrupting,
immoral principle. . . .,3 Psychiatry, therefore, cannot
properly represent either prosecution or defense. In no
other way than as friend of the court may the psychiatrist
be competent and effective.
Since Law will not accede to Medicine's pleas and make
the desired reforms, the author suggests that Medicine
itself take the initiative. He advises Psychiatry through its
organization, the American Psychiatric Association, to
formulate its own moral code to govern every qualified
psychiatric witness. Adoption of canons of ethics by the
psychiatrists' accrediting agency would aid in lessening
the expert's antipathy toward the courts and the legal profession. Among the rules, Zilboorg suggests the following:
-Ibid, 112.

-Ibid, 125.
- Ibid, 121.
NIbid, 119.
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First - No qualified psychiatrist may appear either for the
accused or the State. To do so would be considered a violation of established ethical principles of his profession.37
Secondly, - The use of the hypothetical question must be
discontinued.3 8 Zilboorg advises that the witnesses may
refuse to answer such a question since it will be characterized as unethical under the Association rules.39 Thirdly A panel of psychiatric experts must be created, the list to
be offered to both the defense and prosecution, each side
to have the right to make an agreed number of peremptory
challenges, - much the same as in the selection of a jury, until a given number of psychiatric experts are chosen to
serve as court appointed witnesses. 0 Cross-examination by
either side would be permited, and the findings, whether in
agreement or not, would be made available to each side.
This last proposal closely resembles a recently suggested
plan to provide for court appointed medical experts in
Maryland. 41 This procedure, however, contemplates the
appointment of a single expert from the panel rather than
several as suggested by Zilboorg. The practice of permitting an opinion to be voiced by a solitary expert clothed
with the authority of the court has been questioned.4 2
Such a rule may perhaps be questioned on the ground that a witness
who refuses to 'testify would subject himself to citation for contempt.
Though this may be the practice as regards an ordinary witness or even
an expert witness when testifying as to conduct which he actually observed,
it is unlikely to be applicable to the expert In his capacity as an opinion
witness. Thus, he may perhaps safely decline to make a study of facts not
within his personal knowledge in order to form an opinion and testify as
to this for prosecution or defense, since to do so would be professionally
unethical. In any event, it is quite improbable that counsel would seek to
force under subpoena an undeniably hostile witness to disclose his expert
opinion. 12 AM. JUR., CONTEMPT, Sec. 16, p. 400.
IFor a criticism of the hypothetical question, see MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE
(1954), 33, Sec. 16. On advantages of the hypothetical question from the
doctor's viewpoint, see DAVIDSON, FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY (1952), 281.
"It would seem, however, that if the duty of serving as witness is once
undertaken, the expert would then be subjected to the legally accepted form
of evidentiary procedure. Though his refusal to serve as a witness save as
a friend of the court may be conceded, it is questionable whether, having
submitted, as It were, to normal court procedure, he would be permitted to
qualify his testimony by excluding the distasteful hypothetical question.
Cf. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 409; UNIFORmM RULES OF EVIDENCE
(Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, 1953), Rule 59, p. 194.
," Dr. Zilboorg ignores the fact that in many areas the paucity of qualified
psychiatrists would make such procedure well nigh Impossible.
,Daily Record, January 11 & 12, and February 1, 1955.
The plan has been criticized by ithe Maryland State, the Baltimore City
and the Baltimore County Bar Associations on the ground that it is likely
to create evils similar to those it was designed to abolish, and these Associations have expressed disapproval of it. It has been suggested that if the
case is one where an honest difference of opinion exists within the medical
profession itself, this divergence may be reflected by the experts called by
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As a final point, and apparently as an afterthought, Dr.
Zilboorg introduces a rather novel but interesting theory
of penology. He theorizes that society's aggression toward
the accused and its vengeance by way of severe punishment
upon him may only aggravate his hostility and thus block
redemption and rehabilitation. It is suggested that the most
effective cure for criminality and delinquency may rest in
the mechanisms of self-punishment. The salvation of the
delinquent may stem from "the ever-present social instincts
of man"4 which produce within him a sense of guilt. It is
this hidden anxiety which the psychiatrist must utilize in
his efforts toward re-education and ultimate rehabilitation
of the criminal.
In general, this small volume contains a good deal of
interesting and provocative material which might help the
legal profession in its largely unsuccessful attempts to
understand the psychiatric branch of the medical profession. However, it fails to create an atmosphere conducive
to a rapprochement of the two fields of endeavor. Redundancy of ideas, a general disinclination to organize the material in a logically progressive manner, and inadequacy of
citations mar the work. Possibly the explanation for these
minor deficiencies may rest upon the fact that the book is
an amplification of material which was originally presented
orally in the Yale lectures.
The impression of a tendency toward exhibitionism,
sensationalism, and self-satisfied condescension may antagonize the reader. It is unlikely that the author intended his
thoughts to be complacently encountered; portions of his
work border on the melodramatic and apparently are included only for the sake of sensationalism. As disgusting
a case history as that of Albert Fish, if necessary at all,
could have been presented adequately without squandering six or more pages on superfluous repulsive details."
Pointing out every lurid fact of this case is of no conceivable benefit to the reader, though perhaps it may be of
some hidden psychological value to the author.
Zilboorg is rather extreme in a number of his analyses.
For example, he interprets the conduct of certain English
pickpockets who carried on their activities in the shadow
the opposing parties. Therefore, to the public as well as to the jury the
expert witness who dares to disagree with the gospel of the court sponsored
prophet is likely to appear as a charlatan and the counsel of the party
employing him as a shyster espousing an unfounded cause. Furthermore.
the jury is not psychologically free to determine the "truth" or "falsity"
of the conflicting opinions.
,3 ZnLBooRG, 130.
"Ibid, 56-63, 64, 66, 67, 83.

92
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of the gallows as ".... their revenge for their own vicarious
execution". 5 It might be quite interesting to hear his
explanation for similar petty thievery one encounters at
county fairs, in railroad stations or on the Broadway and
Seventh Avenue subway.
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, The Psychology of
the CriminalAct and Punishment is recommended to members of the legal profession as a thought-provoking work
which will help them toward a deeper appreciation of some
of the obscure motivations of the criminal, the psychiatrist
and, indeed, fellow members of the bar.
L. WHITING FARINHOLT, JR.*
Ibid, 66.
• Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law.

